46. Scope of Act / THE POLICE ACT, 1861

46. Scope of Act:-

(l) This Act shall not, by its own operation, take effect in anypresidency, State or place. But the State Government by an order to be published in the Official Gazette, may extend the whole or any part of this Act to any Presidency, State or place, and the whole or such portion of this Act, as shall be specified in such order shall, thereupon, take effect in
such presidency, State or place.

(2) When the whole or any part of this Act shall have been so extended, the State Government may, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules consistent with this Act- .

(a) to regulate the procedure to be followed by Magistrates and police-officers in the discharge of any duty imposed upon them by or under this Act;

(b) to prescribe the time, manner and conditions within and under which claims for compensation under section 15A arc to be made, the particulars to be stated in such claims, the manner in which the same are to be verified, and the
proceedings (including local inquiries, if necessary) which are to be taken consequent thereon; and

(c) generally, for giving effect to the provisions of this Act.

(3) All rules made under this Act may, from time to time be amended, added to or cancelled by the State Government.

COMMENTS
It is only upon an order of the State Government, the whole or any part of this Act lakes effect in the presidency, State or place concerned.
The State Government is empowered to make rules in respect of the matters specified in clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (2).
Section 46 confines itself to anything done or intended to be done under the Police Act, 1861; S.P. Vaithianathan v. K. Shammuganathan, (1994) 1 Crimes 725 (S.C.).
An act is not “‘under” a provision of law merely because the point of time at which it is done coincides with the point of time when some act in exercise of the powers granted by the provision or in performance of the duty imposed by it. To be able to say that an act is done “under” a provision of law, one must discover the existence of a reasonable relationship between the provision and the act. In the absence of such a relation the act cannot be said to be done “under” the particular provision of law, SP. Vaithianathan v. K. Shammuganathan, (1994) 1 Crimes 725 SC; State of A.P. v. Venugopal, (1963) SCR 742.

It is no part of the duty under the Act, conferring power on the police to beat and torture any person; Stale of A.P. v. Venugopal, (1963) SCR 742.
Action of torturing any person cannot be in discharge of any duty or function under the Act.